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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the landmark decision of Payton v. New York! the United 
States Supreme Court reversed the New York Court of Appeals 
and held that warrantless entry into a suspect's home to effect a 
warrantless felony arrest, when done in the absence of either 
consent or exigent circumstances, 2 is unreasonable under the 
fourth amendment. 3 The New York Court of Appeals had held that 
police officers could effect a warrantless and forcible entry of a sus­
pect's home to arrest him, in the absence of exigent circumstances, 
upon a showing of probable cause. 4 The court of appeals based its 
decision on the "substantial difference" between an intrusion which 
attends a search of the premisess and one which attends an entry 
to arrest a suspect, the latter being less objectionable. Char­
* Research attorney, Office of Judicial Education, Judicial Department, State of 
Connecticut; member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in­
Chief of the CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL, 1969-1973; current member of the 
CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL Editorial Board; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1949; 
L.L.B., Georgetown University, 1952. The opinions expressed herein are those of the 
author alone. 
\ 1. 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
2. [d. at 576, 589-90. 
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef­

fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 

no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af­

firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the per­

sons or things to be seized. 

4. People v. Payton, 45 N.Y.2d 300, 310, 380 N.E.2d 224, 228-29, 408 N.Y.S.2d 
395,399 (1980), rev'd sub nom. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
5. [d. at 310,380 N.E.2d at 228, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 399. 
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acterizing a warrantless entry to arrest as "a routine felony arrest, "6 
the Supreme Court reasoned that an arrest and a search both re­
sult in entry of a private home: any differences between the two 
regarding intrusiveness are merely of degree rather than of kind. 
Thus, the Court concluded that both an arrest and a search for 
incriminating evidence implicate the same privacy interests under 
the fourth amendment7 and require the "same level of constitu­
tional protection. "8 This protection is provided by the warrant re­
quirement of the fourth amendment. 
While the Payton Court sanctioned warrantless entries under 
certain 'circumstances, it failed to address9 the specific kinds of 
emergencies that must exist before warrantless entries to arrest 
suspects are constitutionally valid. 10 This article. analyzes the emer­
gency entry issue and evaluates the circumstances when exigent 
entries are lawful. First, it reviews the general conditions which 
justify an emergency entry in the absence of a warrant. Second, it 
analyzes the specific criteria supporting warrantless entries. Third, 
it· reviews the unannounced entry doctrine which requires officers 
to announce their authority and purpose prior to all entries, even 
those supported by a warrant. Finally, it concludes that courts 
·shouldassess warrantless police conduct under the totality of the 
circumstances approach since that approach best accommodates the 
competing policies of privacy and efficient law enforcement. 
II. CRITERIA FOR EMERGENCY ENTRY 
Law is a code of rules governing human conduCt in a civilized 
society. One such rule, the rule of reasonableness, is embodied in 
the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. The con­
cept of reasonableness under the fourth amendment does not lend 
6. 445 U.S. at 591. 
7. Id. at 589-90. Furthermore, arrests and searc~es are governed by the same 
constitutional principles and the same standard of reasonableness. [d. See Sabbath v. 
United States, 391 y.S. 585, 588-89 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 
306,308-09 (1958). 
8. 445 U.S. at 588. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court reaffirmed the pri­
macy of the warrant requirement in the home. [d. at 585-90; see United States v. 
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 565 (1976) (dictum); United States v. United 
States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
9. Another unresolved issue is whether a law enforcement officer has the au­
thority to enter the home of a third party to arrest a suspect in the absence of exigent 
circumstances. For an analysis of this issue, see Steagald v. United States, 101 S. 
Ct. 1642 (1981); Mascolo, Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants: The Seizure of a 
Suspect in the Home of a Third Party, 54 CONN. B.J. 299 (1980). 
10. 445 U.S. at 583. 
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itself to "precise definition or mechanical application."l1 It requires 
a balancing of the need to search or seize against the invasion of 
privacy that the search or seizure entails. In assessing the reason­
ableness of search and seizure activity under the fourth amend­
ment, courts have considered the following factors: The justification 
for initiating an intrusion; the scope and degree of intrusion; the 
manner of execution; and the locale in which the search or seizure 
is conducted. 12 Ultimately, the standard of reasonableness for 
fourth amendment purposes is determined by assessing both the 
invasion of the individual's privacy interests and the "promotion of' 
legitimate governmental interests" through effective law enforce­
ment. 13 This assessment requires an accommodation between two 
conflicting interests: The individual's right to be free from arbi­
trary governmental intrusion and society's need for effective law en­
forcement. 14 ­
Because the fourth amendment establishes a standard of rea­
sonableness, it operates as a limitation upon the official exercise of 
power. 1S By imposing a standard of reasonableness upon the exer­
cise of discretion by law enforcement officers the fourth amend­
ment protects the security and privacy of the individual against ar­
bitrary intrusions. 1s The standard of reasonableness requires that 
the facts relied upon to justifY an intrusion "be capable of measure­
ment against'an objective standard.' "17 This ensures that the indi­
vidual's privacy interests are not subject to the discretionary mercy 
of law enforcement officials. 1s 
11. 'Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979). 
12. Id, See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal 
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). 
13. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (footnote omitted); see United 
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976). 
14. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1972) 
(electronic surveillance improper in absence of warrant despite need to protect do­
mestic security). 
15. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971); see 
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 353, 400 
(1974). 
16. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979); see Marshall v. Barlow's, 
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). 
17. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (footnote omitted). 
18. ld, at 654-55; Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523,532 (1967); Aguilar 
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 1l0-1l (1964); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 
455-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); see Boyd v. 
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886); Wilkes v. Wood, 19 Howell St. Tr. 1153, 
1167 (C.P. 1763); 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 141-42 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel 
eds. 1965); Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 396. 
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A fundamental tenet of fourth amendment jurisprudence is 
that the individual's "'legitimate expectations of privacy' "19 are 
most pronounced in the home. 20 To ensure fulfillment of these ex­
pectations, the authors of the amendment erected certain barriers 
to forcible and warrantless entries into the home by police offi­
cers.21 The major barrier is the requirement of a warrant. 22 Since 
the warrant requirement is particularly strong in the home set­
ting,23 the Supreme Court has held that warrantless arrests within 
a private residence are "presumptively unreasonable."24 There are 
certain "specifically established and well-delineated exceptions"25 
to the Court's general command for a warrant. One such exception 
is the emergency doctrine, or the concept of exigent circum­
stances. 26 
A judicial barrier to forcible and warrantless entries into the 
home by police officers has been established by requiring the pros­
ecution to justify its exemption from the warrant requirement. 27 
19. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979); accord, Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 
U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-93 (1980); Rakas v. 
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 148-49 (1978). 
20. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 585-90; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 
428 U.S. 543, 561, 565 (1976) (dictum); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 389 
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane); Mascolo, The Duration of Emergency Searches: The In­
vestigative Search and the Issue of Re-entry, 55 N.D. L. REV. 7, 8-9 (1979); see 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978); United States v. United States Dist. 
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). See also Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 363, in which 
the author noted, "Indisputably, forcible entries by officers into a person's home ... 
are the aboriginal subject of the fourth amendment and the prototype of the 
'searches' and 'seizures' that it covers." 
21. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886); Amsterdam, supra note 15, at 
363. For historical background of the amendment, see Entick v. Carrington, 19 How­
ell St. Tr. 1029, 1063-74 (C.P. 1765), which had a pronounced influence upon the ev­
olution and enactment of the fourth amendment. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. at 
626-27, 630. 
22. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 585-90. 
23. [d.; United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 565(1976) (dic­
tum). 
24. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 586 (footnote omitted); see Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967). 
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
26. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 575-76,590; Mincey v. Arizona, 
437 U.S. 385, 392-93, 394 (1978). 
27. United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir.), cen. denied, 439 V.S. 
913 (1978); State v.Olson, 287 Or. 157, __, 598 P.2d 670, 674 (1979) (en bane); see 
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 V.S. 385, 390-91 (1978); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 
(1970) (applying rule to warrantless searches); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
762 (1969) (applying rule to warrantless searches). 
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Moreover, the prosecution has the burden of demonstrating the ex­
istence of exigent circumstances. 28 These barriers protect the 
heightened privacy interests in the home and prevent the warrant 
exception from swallowing the general rule. The effect of this bur­
den, however, may vary according to the situs of the court. For ex­
ample, the court in Dorman v. United States29 contended that a 
"heavy" burden must be met to excuse a warrant requirement. 30 
Conversely, the Second Circuit, in United States v. Reed,31 simply 
noted that the burden of justifying the exemption must be "reason­
able. "32 In view of the strong privacy interests associated with the 
home,33 the Donnan approach is preferable to the Reed standard. 
It should, therefore, be endorsed by the courts34 to prevent abuses 
of the emergency exception to the warrant requirement. 
The difficulty in defining an emergency also may serve as a 
barrier to warrantless entries. In general, the emergency doctrine 
is a flexible concept which, like the concept of reasonableness, is 
not subject to a precise definition. An emergency is not a static 
concept; it may pertain to a myriad of factual situations. 35 Its es­
sence is a compelling sense of urgency that tolerates no delay and 
28. United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 979 (3d Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), een. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980). See 
United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 4( 44 (1st Cir. 1980) (government acknowledged 
burden). 
29. 435 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en bane). 
30. [d. at 392. 
31. 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), een. denied, 439 U.S. 913 (1978). 
32. [d. at 424. 
33. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972). 
34. In fact, the Seventh Circuit has recently done so. United States v. Acevedo, 
627 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1980). The Second Circuit apparently has followed the 
Dorman approach. See United States v. Vasquez, 638 F.2d 507, 531 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(relying upon Payton). The validity of a warrantless arrest is an important issue since 
it determines the initial legality of the search conducted incidental to the arrest un­
der the Chimel rule. See Chime!. v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969). If the ar­
rest is illegal, then according to Chimel, the search conducted incident to the arrest 
is also invalidated. See generally United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 60 (1950); 
United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1102, 1123 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Reed, 572 F.2d at 425. 
35. See United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 1980); Dorman 
v. United States, 435 F.2d at 392; Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. 
Cir.) (Burger, J., concurring) (dictum), cat. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); Mascolo, su­
pra note 20, at 12-13. In fact, the exigencies which will justify a warrantless arrest 
may differ from those which will sanction a warrantless search. Commonwealth v. 
Forde, 367 Mass. 798,805-06, 329 N.E.2d 717, 722 (1975); Laasch v. State, 84 Wis. 
2d 587, 594-95, 267 N.W.2d 278, 283 (1978). For a summary of the criteria exempting 
the need for a search warrant, see Mascolo, supra note 20, at 13-14. 
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necessitates an immediate response. 36 Courts use the following fac­
tors to determine whether exigent circumstances exist: (1) The 
gravity of the offense involved; (2) whether a reasonable basis exists 
for believing that the suspect is armed; (3) a clear showing of prob­
able cause, including reasonably trustworthy evidence, to establish 
that the suspect committed the offense in question; (4) strong rea­
son to believe that the suspect will be located within the premises 
being entered; (5) a likelihood of escape unless apprehension is 
quickly effected; and (6) the peaceful circumstances surrounding 
the officers' entry.37 The last element bears on the reasonableness 
of the law enforcement officers' conduct and attitude. 38 These cri­
teria are generally referred to as the Donnan standards or analysis 
since they were first articulated by the United States Court of Ap­
peals for the District of Columbia in Donnan v. United States. 39 In 
fact, Dorman requires scrutiny of an additional factor: Whether the 
entry is made in the daytime or at night. This time element affects 
the exigent circumstance analysis since it tends to show whether 
procuring a warrant might have entailed unnecessary delay and 
whether police conduct was reasonable under the fourth amend­
36. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978); United States v. Adams, 
621 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 
1978); Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 1294 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub 
nom. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 
F.2d 4, 8 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); Dorman v. United States, 
435 F.2d at 390-91, 393, 396; Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.) 
(Burger, J., concurring) (dictum), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People v. Ramey, 
16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (en banc), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976); State v. Lloyd, 606 P.2d 913, 918 & n.5 (Hawaii 1980) 
(per curiam); Mascolo, supra note 20, at 12-15. See generally Kelder & Statman, The 
Protective Sweep Doctrine: Recurrent Questions Regarding the Propriety of 
Searches Conducted Contemporaneously with an Arrest on or Near Private Prem­
ises, 30 SYRACUSE L. REV. 973 (1979); Note, Warrantless Entnj to Arrest: A Practi­
cal Solution to a Fourth Amendment Problem, 1978 U. ILL. L.F. 655; Comment, 
Forcible Entry to Effect a Warrantless Arrest-The Eroding Protection of the Cas­
tle, 82 DICK. L. REV. 167 (1977). . 
- 37. United States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1978); United States 
v. Reed, 572 F.2d at 424; United States v. Shye,492 F.2d 886, 891 (6th Cir. 1974); 
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 392-93; State v. Jones, 274 N.E.2d 273, 275-76 
(Iowa 1979); see Huotari v. Vanderport, 380 F. Supp. 645, 650 (D. Minn. 1974). 
An armed suspect may be included within the type of exigency created when 
harm to officers or innocent bystanders seems imminent. For recognition of this cate­
gory, see United States v. Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 317-18 (3d Cir. 1980). 
38. By announcing their identity and mission, the police will afford the suspect 
an opportunity to surrender without violence, and thus avoid invading the privacy of 
the home. Dorman V. United States, 435 F.2d at 393; see State v. Jones, 274 N.W.2d 
at 276 (Iowa 1979). 
39. 435 F.2d at 385. 
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ment. Moreover, the time of day may potentially affect the ade­
quacy of probable cause to believe that the suspect will be located 
in the place entered. 40 Thus, "particular concern over. . . reason­
ableness [stems from nighttime entries]. "41 A higher degree of prob­
able cause may be needed to establish both the suspect's guilt and 
his presence in the place entered than that necessary for daytime 
entries. 42 
Although the Donnan criteria generally are endorsed by the 
courts,43 they are criticized by some commentators. Professor 
LaFave, for example, doubts that the Donnan criteria are sound. 44 
He questions whether law enforcement officers will be able to con­
duct themselves within constitutional restraints if they are guided 
by rules which necessitate on-the-scene assessments of imprecise 
and often competing factors. In short, the preservation of fourth 
amendment interests will not be served by imposing upon the po­
lice a code of conduct that is too sophisticated to be applied prop­
erly and in good faith with any reasonable degree of consistency. 
This argument, however, overlooks the fact that most of the 
standards will have been satisfied before the police enter the sus­
pect's residence. Surely the first four standards45 will have been 
determined prior to the time the police arrive at the residence. 
Moreover, in a number of instances the fifth standard also will 
have been met prior to arrival. 46 More fundamentally, Professor 
LaFave~s assessment ignores the realities of the situation. The es­
sence of an emergency, which is the pressing need for quick ac­
tion, often will arise only after arrival. At that point the situation is 
in its most fluid, and potentially most dangerous, stage. 47 Therefore, 
the Donnan standards are good, if not perfect, objective criteria by 
which to judge police conduct, especially since most of the 
standards can be satisfied by the police before they enter the sus­
pect's residence. 
40. [d. at 393. 
41. [d. 
42. [d.; see United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1l02, 1122 n.1O (8th Cir. 1979). 
See also Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499-500 (1958). 
43. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 587; United States v. Kulcsar, 586 
F.2d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 
1978). 
44..2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 6.1, at 390 (1978). 
45. See text accompanying note 37, supra. 
46. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980). 
47. See, e.g., Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 388, 393-94. 
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The courts, while recognizing the Dorman standards as valid, 
have refused to adhere to them blindly. Some courts, while willing 
to consider and even to utilize the Dorman approach, have not ap­
plied it rigidly to every case. For example, the First Circuit, while 
acknowledging the value of "the Donnan analysis," has refused to 
apply it "as a pass or fail checklist for determining exigency. "48 
Rather, the First Circuit examines all the facts in order to deter­
mine whether a compelling need for immediate or prompt action 
existed. "The ultimate test," in the words of the court, "is whether 
there is such a compelling necessity for immediate action as will 
not brook the delay of obtaining a warrant. "49 Thus, the Donnan 
factors have been viewed as flexible guidelines that are not entitled 
to "condition precedent" status, and the reasonableness of an 
emergency entry has been assessed in terms of all the circum­
stances "bearing upon the exigencies of the situation. "50 
This totality of the circumstances approach is sensible, for it 
places a premium on the realities of the situations confronting law 
enforcement officers just prior to and at the moment of entry. Al­
though almost every emergency is unique and must be determined 
on an ad hoc basis,51 each has one element in common with all the 
others: A compelling need for qUick action. An emergency is a 
fluid situation fraught with danger. It does not lend itself to delib­
eration. Within its framework, time is of the essence. The police 
often will be required to make snap judgments with no more sup­
port for their decisions than their experience and sound instincts. 
To subject emergency situations to deliberation would heighten the 
risk of danger to officer and bystander. 52 Although a warrantless 
and forcible entry represents a serious intrusion into the sanctity of 
the home, it is necessary when there is reason to believe that 
48. United States v. Adams, 621 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 1980). 
49. Id. 
50. State V. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 118 (N.D. 1979). Accord, United States V. 
Jones, 635 F.2d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1980) (gravity of offense not "an absolute test" 
for presence of exigent circumstances, in that such determination "ultimately de­
pends on the unique facts of each controversy"); United States V. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 
68, 70 (7th Cir. 1980); United States V. Boyd, 496 F. Supp. 25, 28-29 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). 
The Boyd court stated that the presence of danger may justify an immediate official 
response, even though the element of flight has not been satisfied. Id. 
51. See United States V. Morrow, 541 F.2d 1229, 1232 (7th Cir. 1976) (per 
curiam), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 933 (1977); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 
P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (en bane), cert.denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976). 
52. See Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 -(D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., con­
curring) (dictum), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People v. Solario, 19 Cal. 3d 760, 
764, 566 P.2d 627, 629, 139 Cal. Rptr. 725, 727 (1977). 
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alternative courses of action may result in violence, escape, or de­
struction of evidence. Thus, the presence of exigent circumstances 
must be determined on the basis of the facts known to the officers 
at the time of the entry. 53 
Accordingly, if subsequent events demonstrate that law en­
forcement officers had sufficient time and opportunity to seek a 
warrant, that will be strong evidence that an emergency did not ex­
ist, but it will not be controlling. 54 What will be determinative of 
the issue of exigency is the reasonableness of the officers' percep­
tion that a situation was fluid and potentially volatile. If a reason­
able assessment of the situation dictates the conclusion that swift, 
responsive action is required, or probably will be required on a 
moment-to-moment basis, the officers will be justified in acting 
without a warrant, even though facts subsequently learned indicate 
that the emergency was more apparent than real. 55 
The fundamental consideration affecting the reasonableness of 
warrantless entry for arrest is whether the circumstances con­
fronting the officers renders timely resort to the warrant process 
infeasible. 56 This issue must be resolved on an ad hoc basis since it 
implicates a myriad of variables. 57 The Dorman analysis will con­
53. United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 979 (3d Cir. 1981); People v. Ramey, 
16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, '545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 C~d. Rptr. 629, 637 (en bane), eert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 929 \ (1976); People V. Stephens, 18 Ill. App. 3d 812, 821, 310 
N.E.2d 755, 759 (1st Dist. 1974) (existence of exigent circumstances justifies exemp­
'tion from requirement 6f announcement of authority and purpose prior to forcible 
entry); State V. Page, 27TN.W.2d 112, U8 (N.D. 1979). 
54. See People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 276-77, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. 
Rptr. 629, 637 (en bane), eert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976); Commonwealth v. Forde, 
367 Mass. 798,807,329 N.E.2d 717, 723 (1975). 
55. See United States V. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), eert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980); United States V. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir. 
1978). See also Wayne V. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., 
concurring) (dictum), eert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 
486, 489 (Del. 1967); State V. Theodosopoulos, 119 N.H. 573, 580, 409 A.2d 1134, 
1139 (1979), eert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980) (reasonable basis for belief of emer­
gency is all that is required). 
56. See Mincey V. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978); Vale V. Louisiana, 399 
U.S. 30, 35 (1970); United States V. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Campbell, 581 F.2d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 1978); Wayne V. United States, 318 F.2d 
205, 212 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., concurring) (dictum), eert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 
(1963); People V. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 
629, 637 (en bane), eert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976); State V. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 
118 (N.D. 1979). 
57. See United States V. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 70 (7th Cir. 1980); United States 
v. Morrow, 541 F.2d 1229, 1232 (7th Cir. 1976) (en bane) (per curiam), eert. denied, 
430 U.S. 933 (1977); Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, 
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tribute to this determination, but it should not be viewed as a con­
dition precedent to a finding of exigency under the fourth amend­
ment. Ultimately, the courts should approach this issue with an 
understanding of the particular circumstances confronting the offi­
cers in light of their experience and their assessment of the situa­
tion. It is difficult to convey to an impartial judicial officer the 
sense of urgency that pervades an emergency. The Dorman ap­
proach is a useful tool in bridging this gap, but it should not be 
used as a substitute for a critical examination of the circumstances 
surrounding a warrantless entry in light of the officers' experience 
and instinctive knowledge. 58 
J., concurring) (dictum), eert. denied, .375 U.S. 860 (196.3); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 
.3d 26.3, 276, 545 P.2d 1.3.3.3, 1.341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 6.37 (en bane), eert. denied, 429 
U.S. 9.39 (1976). For example, a law enforcement officer, in "hot pursuit" of a fleeing 
suspect, may effect a warrantless arrest in the home of the suspect. United States v. 
Santana, 427 U.S . .38, 42-4.3 (1976); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298"99 (1967). 
An officer may also take into custody a dangerous, or escaping, suspect, on the basis 
of probable cause to believe that the suspect is within the premises when time is of 
the essence and recourse to a warrant is impracticable. United States v. Reed, 572 
F.2d at 424; Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 392-93; Mascolo, supra note 20, at 
13; see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978); Rice v. Wolff, 513 F.2d 1280, 
1294, 1296 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465 (1976). Additionally, officers will be permitted to take prompt action to pro­
tect life and property, to apprehend a suspect in the process of committing an of­
fense, to prevent the suspect's flight, and to preserve evidence from actual or immi­
nent destruction or loss. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392-93, 394; C.M. 
Leasing, Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 361-62 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concur~ 
ring) (dictum); Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970); United States v. Jabara, 618 
F.2d 1319, 1324 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 
1979), eert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980); United States v. Estese, 479 F.2d 1273, 1274 
(6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); People v. Solario, 19 Cal. 3d 760, 763-64, 566 P.2d 627, 
629, 139 Cal. Rptr. 725, 727 (1977). Although the hot-pursuit, fleeing-suspect, and 
destruction-of-evidence cases are the "most common examples of exigent circum­
stances," United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d at 739, this list is by no means exhaust­
ive. For further examples, see Mascolo, supra note 20, at 13-14. 
58. See United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), eert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980) (the court stated that if a reasonable assessment of the 
situation dictates a conclusion that swift responsive action is required, or will be re­
quired on a moment-to-moment basis, the police may act without a warrant, even 
though it is subsequently learned that the emergency was more apparent that real); 
United Sates v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. 
Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 10 (9th Cir. 1973), eert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); 
Wayne v. United States, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J., concurring) (dic­
tum), eert. denied, 375 U.S. 860 (1963); People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 
P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (en bane), eert. denied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976); 
State v. Page, 277 N.W.2d 112, 118 (N.D. 1979). See also United States v. Manning, , 
448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing (en bane), 448 F.2d 997, 1000-02 (2d Cir.), 
eert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971). 
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III. ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC CRITERIA 
Certain circumstances are considered to provide law enforce­
ment officers with sufficient facts to support a warrantless search or 
arrest. These include the potential for flight, the presence of weap­
ons, the destruction or loss of evidence, and the belief, based upon 
probable cause, that a suspect is present in his home. Once again, 
however, the existence of an exigency may vary according to fac­
tors within these broad categories. 
A. The Element of Flight 
An officer's perception that flight or escape is likely should 
constitute adequate probable cause to justify a warrantless search or 
arrest. In other words, the police should have reason to believe 
that an imminent escape is likely before they may act without a 
warrant. 59 The mere possibility that an individual in his home 
might "make a break" or otherwise attempt an escape, however, is 
insufficient to give rise to exigent circumstances. If less than proba­
ble cause were required, a warrantless entry to arrest would be 
justified any time law enforcement officers announced their pres­
ence and a suspect did not promptly come out of his home. This 
would vitiate the fourth amendment barriers since "The practical ef­
fect of this would be to all but eliminate the requirement that 
there be exigent circumstances in order to justify a warrantless en­
try to arrest. "60 Therefore, in the absence of probable cause that an 
For a critical assessment of the Dorman approach, see Donnino & Girese, Exi­
gent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 ALBANY L. REV. 90, 104-06, 
112-13 (1980). 
59. United States v. Acevedo, 627 F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1980) (imminent flight, 
coupled with lack of time to secure all possible exits from apartment building); 
United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 
934 (1980); State v. Rudolph, 369 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. 1979), State V. Page, 277 
N.W.2d 112, 118-19 (N.D. 1979); State v. Peller, 287 Or. 255, _, 598 P.2d 684, 689 
(1979); see Ker V. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Bremian, J., concurring & dis­
senting); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958) (dictum); United States V. 
Flickinger, 573 F.2d 1349, 1355 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 836 (1978); United 
States V. Easter, 552 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977); 
United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 8-9, 11 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 970 (1974); Dorman V. United States, 435 F.2d at 393. 
60. State V. Peller, 287 Or. 255, _, 598 P.2d 684, 689 (1979) (a suspect who 
remains in his house and does not respond to the police has not demonstrated an in­
tent to escape that will justify an emergency response); see United States V. 
Velasquez, 626 F.2d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 1980) (mere failure to respond promptly to an 
announcement of identity, coupled with presence of undercover agent in home, 
negates an assumption of imminent flight). 
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escape is imminent, the police should set up surveillance of the 
premises and should seek a warrant. 61 For example, the mere 
sound of running feet coming from within a residence after police 
demand entry is insufficient by itself to establish exigent circum­
stances when there is no indication that escape is likely, or that the 
suspect knows of the presence of the police, or when there is no 
reasonable basis for believing that the suspect is armed and thus 
"presents a danger to the safety of the investigating officers. "62 
Conversely, the sound of someone running inside in response to 
both a police announcement of authority and demand for entry is 
sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect is at­
tempting to escape. 63 Moreover, a warrantless entry may be 
upheld simply by a knock and an announcement of identity when 
those within the premises already know of the officers' authority 
and purpose and sounds of running and scuflling are coming from 
the residence. 64 
Finally, an exigency may arise from a combination of the time 
of entry and the accessibility of a rapid means of escape. For exam­
ple, when a suspect's home is visited at night, his automobile is 
parked in the yard, and access to the automobile from the resi­
dence is facilitated by the darkness of night, forcible entry after the 
announcement of authority and purpose is justified.65 Thus, the 
time of entry may affect not only the suspect's reaction to the entry 
but also the reasonableness of the officers' actions. 
B. The Presence of Weapons 
The threat of being confronted with an armed suspect is up­
permost in the law officer's mind every time he enters a home to 
make an arrest. Therefore, the potential for violence is present in 
every case and must be assessed on an ad hoc basis. While there is 
no hard-and-fast rule governing police entries into homes, certain 
standards can be applied to accommodate both the individual's pri­
vacy rights and the safety of the police and innocent bystanders. 
61. State v. Peller, 287 Or. 255, _, 598 P.2d 684, 689 (1979). 
62. United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1102, 1123 (8th Cir. 1979); see Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482-84 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 
301,309-13 (1958). 
63. State v. Rudolph, 369 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. 1979). 
64. United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing (en 
bane), 448 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir.), eert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); see United 
States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir. 1978). 
65. United States v. Williams, 573 F.2d 348, 350 (5th Cir. 1978). 
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Safety is not threatened simply because a suspect owns a 
weapon. Ownership of a gun does not mean that it will be used 
against police officers seeking entry into a home. Mere ownership 
or legal possession of a firearm will not create an exigency in the 
absence of a reasoned belief by the officers, supported by specific 
facts, that the weapon will be used against them. 66 For example, 
the fact that a residence contains both weapons and an elaborate 
system of security devices will not justify an emergency entry 
when there is no prior history of violence on the part of the occu­
pant and when the occupant indicates to the police his willingness 
to leave the premises and to submit peacefully to arrest. 67 
Unless there is evidence that the suspect has used a firearm 
recently in the commission of a crime,68 possession or ownership of 
a dangerous weapon, without more, will not reasonably support the 
belief that a suspect poses a threat to the arresting officers or that 
he is armed at the time of apprehension. 69 In essence, unless the 
police have probable cause to believe that the suspect is armed,70 
the suspect's ownership or possession of a firearm will not legiti­
mize an emergency entry supposedly based on an urgent need to 
disarm the subject and to protect the arresting officers. 71 
Apparently, courts have distinguished between mere posses­
66. People v. Dumas, 9 Cal. 3d 871, 878-79, 512 P.2d 1208, 1213, 109 Cal. Rptr. 
304, 309 (1973) (en bane); People v. Vollheim, 87 Cal. App. 3d 538, 541, 151 Cal. 
Rptr. 837,839 (5th Dist. 1978). . 
67. People v. Vollheim, 87 Cal. App. 3d 538, 543, 151 Cal. Rptr. 837, 839-40 
(5th Dist. 1978). 
68. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (8th Cir. 1980); 
Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1966), eert. denied, 388 U.S. 
922 (1967). 
69. United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 1976). 
70. See United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 979-80 (3d Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Jones, 635 F.2d 1357, 1360-61 (8th Cir. 1980); Gilbert v. United States, 366 
F.2d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir, 1966), eert. "denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967). One court had 
contended that in the absence of recent criminal use of a firearm, probable cause 
to believe that a suspect is armed is insufficient to constitute an emergency. State v. 
Olson, 287 Or. 157, _, 598 P.2d 670, 674 (1979) (ell bane); see People v. Ramey, 
16 Cal. 3d 263, 276, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341, 127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 637 (ell bane), eert. 
dellied, 429 U.S. 929 (1976). This approach, however, clearly is erroneous since an 
armed suspect is a dangerous suspect, and his presence should be sufficient to justifY 
immediate action. See United States v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 1980); 
Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 393 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (ell bane); Gilbert v. 
United States, 366 F.2d 923, 931-32 (9th Cir. 1966), eert. dellied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967). 
The recent use of a firearm should reinforce the compelling need for urgent action, 
and not be the sine qua 11011 of such action. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 
298-99 (1967); Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 393. 
71. United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 1976). 
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sion or ownership, on the one hand, and prior use of a weapon, on 
the other hand, in assessing exigent circumstances. Thus, the pos­
session of a firearm coupled with its recent use in the commission 
of a crime of violence72 will qualify as an emergency justifYing 
warrantless entry.73 This approach is valid for two reasons. First, it 
accommodates the privacy rights of individuals who merely possess 
weapons. Second, it recognizes the need to protect police and in­
nocent bystanders by allowing emergency action when a suspect 
has demonstrated a history of using a weapon. 
C. The Destruction or Loss of Evidence 
The destruction or loss of evidence, not discussed in the Dor­
man analysis of emergency, is clearly a critical circumstance to be 
considered in determining the existence of an exigency. As with 
other exigent circumstances, this standard should be governed by 
. the officer's belief, based upon probable cause, that evidence will 
be lost or destroyed unless immediate action is taken. Once again, 
analysis often will hinge on events arising subsequent to the arrival 
of the officer at the suspect's home. Satisfaction of this standard 
therefore should require a reasoned belief by the police, in light of 
their knowledge and experience, and in particular in light of their 
assessment of the situation immediately prior to entry, that de­
struction of evidence is likely to occur if they delay their entry. 
For example, the sound of someone running inside the residence 
in response to a police announcement of authority and demand for 
entry is sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that a suspect, 
whom the officer is investigating on the basis of probable cause, is 
attempting to destroy evidence. 74 Prompt action is also justified 
72. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967); State v. Olson, 287 Or. 157, 
_, 598 P.2d 670, 674 (1979) (en bane); see Gilbert v. United States, 366 F.2d 923, 
931-32 (9th Cir. 1966), eer!. denied, 388 U.S. 922 (1967). The same possession and 
use analysis pertains to explosives. See, e.g., United States v. Picariello, 568 F.2d 
222, 226 (1st Cir. 1978) (permitting agents to gain entry to secure premises pending 
arrival of search warrant when there was probable cause to believe that dynamite 
bombs, some of which had been used recently, might explode, injuring innocent per­
sons). 
73. In this setting, the presence of weapons will be germane to the gravity of 
the offense involved under the Dorman analysis. See notes 35-42 supra. 
74. State v. Mariano, 152 Conn. 85, 97-98, 203 A.2d 305, 312 (1964), eer!. 
denied, 380 U.S. 943 (1965); State v. Gallo, 20 Wash. App. 717, 723-24, 582 P.2d 558, 
563, (1978); see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 47 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring & 
dissenting); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958) (dictum); United States 
v. Gomez, 633 F.2d 999, 1008 (2d Cir. 1980), een, denied, 101 S. Ct. 1695 (1981) 
(scurrying of feet, water running through pipes, and flushing toilet are sufficient to 
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under the emergency exception when officers observe that evi­
dence is being removed. 75 
The fact that particular kinds of evidence readily lend them­
selves to destruction is not sufficient in itself to establish an exigent 
circumstance. 76 Other factors, however, when combined with the 
readily disposable nature of the evidence, may justifY warrantless 
entry.77 Not only must the evidence sought be easy to destroy or 
conceal, but reasonable cause to believe that the evidence will be 
destroyed is needed. 78 Thus, when the evidence "consists of rela­
tively small amounts of contraband and where a nearby bathroom 
or kitchen provides for easy disposal," law enforcement officers 
may gain lawful entry without a warrant. 79 Additionally, when the 
police have probable cause to believe that the suspect is expecting 
their arrival, the readily disposable nature of the evidence will sus­
tain an emergency entry. 80 
A further circumstance for warrantless entry exists when a 
establish exigent circumstances); United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 
1976). The courts must be vigilant, however, against any attempts by law­
enforcement officers to circumvent the warrant requirement by inducing reactive exi­
gent circumstances through the systematic terrorization of the occupants'of a resi­
dence "in the hope of hearing telltale signs of commotion." United States v. Gomez, 
633 F .2d at 1006. 
Conversely, no exigency exists when prior to. entry the officer does not have a 
substantial basis for believing that incriminating evidence is actually present, when 
sounds indicating the destruction of evidence are absent, and when a fellow officer, 
acting in the capacity of an undercover agent and present within the residence, gives 
no signal or cry that evidence is being destroyed. United States v. Velasquez, 626 
F.2d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 1980). And, a mere "fear or apprehension that evidence will 
be destroyed" is insufficient to demonstrate an exigency. United States v. Levine, 
500 F. Supp. 777, 780-81 (W.D.N.Y. 1980). 
75. G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 361-62 (1977) (Burger, 
C.]., concurring). The Court held, however, that observing the removal of evidence 
more than one day prior to entry is too distant in time to qualify as an exigent cir­
cumstance. [d. at 358-59. 
76. See People v. Ouellette, 78 Ill. 2d 511, 519-20, 401 N.E.2d 507, 510-11 
(1979); People v. Stephens, 18 Ill. App. 3d 817, 823, 310 N.E.2d 755, 760 (1st Dist. 
1974); Commonwealth v. Newman, 429 Pa. 441, 448, 240 A.2d 795, 798 (1968); Note, 
Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84 HARV. L. 
REV. 1465, 1494 (1971). But see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40 (1963) (plurality 
opinion). 
77. See United States v. Blank, 251 F. Supp. 166, 174-75 (N.D. Ohio 1966); 
State v. Mendoza, 104 Ariz. 395, 399-400, 454 P.2d 140, 144-45 (1969) (en bane); Peo­
ple v. Conner, 78 Ill. 2d 525, 532-33, 401 N.E.2d 513, 517 (1979). 
78. People v. Ouellette, 78 Jll. 2d 511, 520, 401 N.E.2d 507, 511 (1979); 2 W. 
LAFAVE, supra note 44, § 4.8, at 134-35. 
79. State v. Clarke, 242 So. 2d 791, 795 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., 4th Dist. 1970). 
80. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40-41 (1963) (plurality opinion). 
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magistrate is not readily available to issue a warrant. For example, 
a warrant is not required when the premises are situated in a re­
mote locale and the officers have reason to believe \ that the sub­
stantial delay required to obtain a warrant will result in the re­
moval or loss of evidence. 81 
It is also relevant that certain evidence, by its very nature, 
will be lost or destroyed if not submitted to immediate examina­
tion. Blood stains typify this kind of evidence that generally is fo­
rensic in nature. Forensic evidence is to be distinguished from 
other forms of evidence, such as narcotics, which, though small in 
size and easy to discard, are difficult to destroy. Therefore, when 
the police are confronted with a situation involving evidence of the 
forensic kind, they may be permitted to effect an emergency en­
try. 82 
D. Probable Cause that Suspect is Present 
Probable cause to believe that a suspect is present in his home 
is a standard that deserves special consideration because of its po­
tential for abuse. Belief that a suspect is present is always a prereq­
uisite for emergency entry83 and is crucial to the concept of reason­
ableness under the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement. Moreover, it may be required when the suspect is 
expected to flee, such as when a suspect returns home after 
committing an offense "to get his affairs together" before at­
tempting an escape. 84 
The Donnan standard does not require probable cause per se; 
rather, it dictates a "strong reason to believe that the suspect is in 
the premises being entered. "85 It does not establish criteria for 
such belief. In the usual arrest situation, however, the home is the 
most likely place to look for a suspect, at least initially.86 The ini­
tial likelihood of presence probably does not satisfy the "strong rea­
81. United States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 102, 105 (9th CiT. 1980). In Gray, the 
agents were unable to locate the federal magistrate, and the nearest state judge re­
sided approximately 55 miles away. Icy and hazardous roads caused by a continuing 
snowstorm made travel impracticable. Id. at 104. 
82. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 406 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring 
& dissenting) (by implication) (blood on floor). 
83. Probable cause to believe that the suspect is in his home is also a prerequi­
site for entry to execute an arrest warrant. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 603. 
84. See United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 739 (3d CiT. 1979), cert. 
denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980). 
85. Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d at 393 (footnote omitted). 
86. See id. at 400 (Wright, J., concurring & dissenting). 
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son to believe" test of whether an individual will be found. The 
likelihood of presence, in this setting, amounts to nothing more 
than a groundless assumption. In a modern and increasingly mobile 
society, and particularly in large urban areas where so much 
violent crime is committed, it simply cannot be assumed with a 
"strong" degree of reliability that an individual will be at home at 
any particular hour of the day or night. Accordingly, "strong reason 
to believe" should require more than a belief based upon an 
unsubstantiated assumption. The standard should be based on 
articulable and reasonably trustworthy information. 
Nevertheless, the home is a good place to initiate a search for 
a suspect. In the likely event that someone other than the suspect 
opens the door in response to a police knock, an inquiry should be 
conducted at the entrance to learn of the suspect's whereabouts. 
Probable or strong cause is lacking if the police receive a negative 
response and nothing else transpires at the entrance that points 
to a reasonable likelihood of the suspect's presence. The officers 
then should not be permitted to cross the threshold without a war­
rant. The Dorman model of probable cause is satisfied, however, if 
events develop establishing a trustworthy basis for believing that 
the suspect is within the premises. 87 For example, a noise or 
sound of running from within, indicating an attempted concealment 
or flight in progress, may constitute such an event. 88 Thus, the 
right to be secure in the home against unreasonable police conduct 
is not violated since police action is based upon specific facts 
constituting probable cause. 
87. Id. at 392-93. 
88. See, e.g., United States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehear­
ing ell ballc, 448 F.2d 997, 1002 (2d Cir.), cert. dellied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); Dorman 
v. United States, 435 F.2d at 394; State v. Rudolph, 369 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (La. 1979). 
See also United States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1286 (8th Cir. 1978) (applying 
standard when agents had reasonable belief that defendant was present in home). 
Moreover, information from a reliable informant, supported by the presence of an in­
dividual of the suspect's race and gender, who opens the front door and then quickly 
ducks back inside in response to the approach of the police, also may qualifY as an 
event supporting probable cause to enter. See United States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 
735, 737, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 934 (1980) (applying standard to 
the presence of a suspect in the home of a third party). 
The Donnall court would have been on firm ground in finding probable cause 
for presence, if it had relied on the belief of the officers that a noise from within, 
after a negative response at the door to the residence, pointed to concealment. In­
stead, the court relied on a prima facie assumption that "a man [most likely will be) 
at home after 10 p.m." 435 F.2d at 393; see id. at 388. In fact, the court implicitly 
conceded that it was not on firm footing because the police had "no special knowl­
edge" that the suspect was at home. Id. at 393. 
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IV. UNANNOUNCED ENTRY 
In addition to the requirement of probable cause, the 
unannounced entry doctrine is a major constraint on the unlimited 
intrusion into the home by law enforcement officers. From earliest 
times, the common law has required that, before a law enforcement 
officer may break open the door of a house to make an arrest, he 
must first state his authority and purpose for demanding admis­
sion. 89 When the occupant assents, the officer is permitted to gain 
entry "with reasonable dispatch" after announcement. 90 If there is 
no response to the announcement after a reasonable period, per­
mission to enter will be deeined constructively denied. 91 The rule 
appears to have been announced first in Semayne's Case92 and has 
been codified by statute. 93 Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in 
Ker v. California,94 apparently has incorporated the doctrine into 
89. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 306-08 (1957); State v. Rauch, 99 
Idaho 586, 592, 586 P.2d 671, 677 (1978). 
Many cases hold that the rule does not mandate any set form of expression. Ker 
v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 48 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting); United 
States v. Manning, 448 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.), rev'd on rehearing en bane, 448 F.2d 997, 
1001 (2d Cir.), eert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); Curtis' Case, Fost. 135, 137, 168 
Eng. Rep. 67, 68 (1756). The rule, however, does "require notice in the form of an 
express announcement by the officers of their purpose for demanding admission." 
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. at 309 (emphasis added). This means that the 
homeowner or occupant must be given notice that the officers are acting" 'under a 
proper authority.''' Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 48 (Brennan, J., concurring & dis­
senting) (quoting Curtis' Case, Fost. 135, 137, 168 Eng.. Rep. at 68); United States v. 
Manning, 448 F.2d at 1001. 
The announcement will not be required at every place of entry; one proper an­
nouncement will be sufficient. United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 10 
(9th Cir. 1973), eert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); United States v. Tirinkian, 502 F. 
Supp. 620, 629 (D.N.D. 1980). 
90. See United States v. Easter, 552 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir.), eert. denied, 434 
U.S. 844 (1977); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 12 (9th CiT. 1973), 
eert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); United States v. Woodring, 444 F.2d 749, 751 (9th 
Cir. 1971) (one-minute interval sufficient when officers had reasonable cause to be­
lieve someone was within). 
91. See United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 11 (9th CiT. 1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). The reasonableness of a wait after announcement 
cannot be mechanically determined and must be assessed in light of the circum­
stances of each particular case. State v. Mariano, 152 Conn. 85, 94, 203 A.2d 305, 311 
(1964), eert. denied, 380 U.S. 943 (1965). 
92. 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (K.B. 1603); see Miller v. 
United States, 357 U.S. 301, 308 (1957). 
93. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976) (applying principle to execution of search 
warrants). 
94. 374 U.S. 23 (1963). 
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the fourth amendment to protect "the security of a householder 
[against police invasions] .."95 
Although the announcement requirement was initially moti­
vated by a desire to prevent damage and inconvenience to the 
homeowner,96 it is now perceived as a means of protecting the pri­
vacy and sanctity of the home97 and as a means of reducing vio­
lence and harm to both officer and homeowner.98 Thus, the rule is 
"deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging 
application, "99 especially - since it expresses "the reverence of the 
law for the individual's right of privacy in his house. "100 
The announcement requirement promotes two privacy inter­
ests. First, it protects the homeowner from the outrage of having 
his residence suddenly and violently broken into without either no­
95. [d. at 53 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting); see United States v. 
Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 
F.2d 4, 9 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); United States v. Manning, . 
448 F.2d 992, rev'd on rehearing en bane, 448 F.2d 997, 1001-02 (2d Cir.), cerl. 
denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971); State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 592, 586 P.2d 671, 677 
(1978); Note, Announcement in Police Entries, 80 YALE L.J. 139, 146 (1970); see Ker 
v. California, 374 U.S. at 37-41 (plurality opinion) (by implication). See also Sabbath 
v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 n.8 (1968). Contra, People v. Wolgemuth, 69 IlL 
2d 154, 164-66,370 N.E.2d 1067, 1072 (1977), cerl. denied, 436 U.S. 908 (1978). 
96. See Semayne's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 91a, 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195-96 (KB. 
1603). This concern is still pertinent. See, e.g., United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 
488 F.2d 4,9 (9th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). 
97. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307, 313 (1958), in which the 
Court pithily summarized the rationale behind the warrant requirement in the adage 
that "a man's house is his castle." [d. at 307; United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 
488 F.2d 4, 11-12 (9th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); State v. Rauch, 
99 Idaho 586, 592-93, 586 P.2d 671, 677-78 (1978). 
98. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 589 (1968); Miller v. United States, 
357 U.S. 301, 313 n.12 (1958); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 460-61 
(1948) (Jackson, J., concurring); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 9 
(9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); People v. Dumas, 9 CaL 3d 871, 
878,512 P.2d 1208, 1213, 109 Cal. Rptr. 304, 309 (1973) (en bane); 2. W. LAFAVE, su­
pra note 44, § 6.2, at 397; Note, supra note 76, at 1492-93; Note, supra note 95, at 
140-41. 
99. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1957). For example, breaking 
and entering will extend to breaking down a door, forCing open a chain lock on a 
partially open door, opening a locked door by means of a pass key, and opening a 
closed but unlocked door. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 590 (1968) 
(dictum in part). Thus, the use of force is not indispensable to breaking open a 
dwelling to effect a search or an arrest, and the concept of breaking and entering will 
be construed broadly to implement constitutional values. [d. at 589. It has not been 
applied, however, to a law officer following immediately after a suspect through an 
open door. People v. Hyter, 61 App. Div. 2d 990, 991,402 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603-04 (2d 
Dept. 1978). 
100. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 313 (1957) (footnote omitted). 
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tice or an opportunity to consent. Second, it serves to reduce the 
possibility of embarrassing situations resulting from the unexpected 
exposure of intimate or othelWise private activities. 101 Therefore, 
in the absence of exigent circumstances, the fourth amendment 
prohibits "an unannounced police intrusion into a private home, 
with or without an arrest warrant, "102 even if there is probable 
cause to support the arrest of a suspect. 103 Waiving the rule of an­
nouncement in the presence of an exigency is logical. Among the 
exigent circumstances that will justifY a waiver of the announce­
ment rule are the presence of an armed suspect, a suspect who 
"might resist arrest," or one who poses a danger to others within 
the premises. 104 The requirement is inapplicable when the author­
ity and purpose of the officers are already known to the person or 
persons within;105 when the officers reasonably believe that those 
101. United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 11-12 (9th Cir. 1973), 
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974); see Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 51-52 (Brennan, 
J., concurring & dissenting); Note, supra note 76, at 1493-94. 
It has been contended that the rule reinforces the dignity of the individual by 
guaranteeing him a reasonable degree of control over his own home. Note, supra 
note 95, at 153. But, as the Ninth Circuit has pointed out, a homeowner has no right 
to deny entry to law officers armed with a warrant or with valid grounds to make a 
warrantless entry. Under the rule of announcement, he has, at most, only a relatively 
short period of time in which to decide whether he will open his door. United States 
v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d at 11. 
102. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting). 
103. Id.; United States v. Murrie, 534 F.2d 695, 698 & n.l (6th Cir. 1976); see 
Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 588-91 (1968); Miller v. United States, 357 
U.S. 301, 308-09, 313 (1958); United States v. Montano, 613 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir. 
1980) (Edwards, C.J., concurring); United States v. Kulcsar, 586 F.2d 1283, 1285-86 
n.2 (8th Cir. 1978); 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1976) (applying same rule to execution of 
search warrants, as interpreted in Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. at 588-89, Wong 
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 482 (1963), and Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 
at 306). 
104. See Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 (1968); United States v. 
Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 
F.2d 4, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). Among the recognized 
dangers is "imminent peril of bodily harm...." Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47 
(Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting); accord, United States v. Fluker, 543 F.2d 
709, 717 (9th Cir. 1976); State v. Mariano, 152 Conn. 85, 95, 203 A.2d 305, 311 
(1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943 (1965); Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706, 710 (Fla. 
1964); see Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. at 591 n.8; Miller v. United States, 357 
U.S. 301, 309 (1958) ("peril of bodily harm" sufficient to invoke exemption from re­
quirement). 
105. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting); 
United States v. Fluker, .543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 1976); Benefield v. State, 160 So. 
2d 706, 710 (Fla. 1964); see Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 n.8 (1968). In 
this setting, the police will not be required to make an announcement since it would 
be "a useless gesture." United States v. Nicholas, 319 F.2d 697, 698 (2d Cir.), cert. 
1981] WARRANTLESS ENTRIES 407 
within, as a result of learning of the presence of someone outside, 
are attempting to escape or to destroy evidence;106 and when the 
officers have reasonable grounds to believe that compliance will 
frustrate the arrest, increase their peril, or permit the destruction 
of evidence. l07 These exceptions do not abrogate the general rule 
requiring announcement, since the prosecutor still has the burden 
of proving an exigency. lOS 
The rule of announcement affords the homeowner a reasonable 
opportunity to comply peaceably with the official demand for en­
try. The rule does not, however, provide a complete shield against 
lawful official entries. If the homeowner refuses to admit the po­
lice, the police are permitted to enter without further delay any­
way. Moreover, the need for such refusal is obviated in emergency 
situations, even if the situation involves only some indication of ex­
igent circumstances. 109 In all these situations, the need for quick 
denied, 375 U.S. 933 (1963) (before narcotics agents could knock and make an­
nouncement, occupant opened door and, on learning their identity, threw herself on 
one of the agents, screaming "police, police"). 
106. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. at 47 (Brennan, J., concurring & dissenting); 
Millerv. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 309 (1958) (dictum); United States v. Fluker, 
543 F.2d 709, 717 (9th Cir. 1976); Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706, 710 (Fla. 1964); 
see Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585, 591 n.8 (1968); United States v. Busta­
mante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). 
107. United States v. Chesher, 640 F.2d 1069, 1073 (9th Cir. 1981) (fear for 
safety must be both sincere and justified); United States v. Kane, 637 F.2d 974, 978-79 
(3d Cir. 1981) (noncompliance justified if an officer reasonably believes his life will 
be placed in danger); People v. Tribble, 4 Cal. 3d 826, 833, 484 P.2d 589, 593, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 613, 617 (1971) (en bane); see State v. Mariano, 152 Conn. 85, 95,203 A.2d 305, 
311 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 943 (1965); Benefield v. State, 160 So. 2d 706, 710 
(Fla. 1964); State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 590, 586 P.2d 671, 675 (1978). 
The Ninth Circuit has argued that entry will be permissible simultaneously with 
or shortly after announcement if there is "a likelihood" of attempted resistance, es­
cape, destruction of evidence, or harm to someone within the premises, "and if a non­
forcible entry is possible...." United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 12 (9th 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). More "specific inferences of exigency" 
will be necessary if forcible entry is required. [d. This would appear to place an un­
due burden on law enforcement officers for it would hamper them in their efforts to 
protect lives, preserve evidence, or prevent flight in the event that non­
forcible entry is not readily open to them. Moreover, there is no automatic correlation 
between exigency and forcible entry. To the contrary, forcible entry is permissible in 
the absence of exigent circumstances, which the court in Bustamante-Gamez itself ap­
peared to recognize. See id. In short, forcible entry involving the physical destruction 
of property should not be governed exclusively by the degree of exigency involved. 
108. See notes 27-34 and accompanying text. 
109. United States v. Bustamante-Gamez, 488 F.2d 4, 12 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 970 (1974). This relatively low standard has been qualified to require 
a substantial showing of exigency. United States v. Chesher, 640 F.2d 1069, 1075 (9th 
Cir. 1981). For example, probable cause to believe that the suspect is armed and dan­
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pOllce action outweighs the intrusion upon the suspect's privacy 
rights. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Payton Court acknowledged that the privacy of the indi­
vidual in his home is the cornerstone of fourth amendment values. 
To foster respect for the individual's dignity and inner worth, the 
Supreme Court has classified warrantless arrests within a private 
residence as "presumptively unreasonable" under the fourth 
amendment. llo The warrant requirement, however, is not inviolate 
in the home setting. Certain exceptions to the warrant requirement 
pertain to arrests on private premises, including that of exigent cir­
cumstances. Urgency and the need for immediate action are cen­
tral to the existence of an exigent or emergency situation. Thus, in 
the face of an exigency, the need to act promptly will take prece­
dence over the warrant requirement. 
In determining whether law enforcement officers have acted 
reasonably when confronted with an alleged emergency, courts 
must conduct a realistic assessment of the situation. The courts 
should take into consideration all the surrounding circumstances 
and the officers' perceptions of those events in the light of their 
knowledge and experience. Probable cause should be the common 
denominator by which courts judge police activity in an alleged ex­
igency., While imprecise conceptually, both the courts and the po­
lice are familiar with the concept. Therefore, if upon careful analy­
sis a reviewing court concludes that the officers had substantial 
reason to believe that they were confronted with a fluid situation 
dominated by an atmosphere of urgent necessity, the court should 
sustain the officers' decision to act promptly without an arrest war­
rant. Conversely, if the court concludes that no substantial basis for 
such action existed, then the court should condemn the failure to 
obtain a warrant as violative of the suspect's rights under the fourth 
amendment. This careful analysis should include an examination of 
both the Dorman standards and the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding the exigency. 
gerous will be sufficient to excuse the need for refusal of admittance. United States v. 
Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 1980). Conversely, neither status as a convicted 
felon nor membership in the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club is sufficient, absent a 
showing of propensity by the homeowner for violence or the use of weapons, to justify 
noncompliance with the refusal-of-admittance requirement. United States v. Chesher, 
640 F.2d at 1073-74 & nn. 3-4. 
llO. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. at 586 (footnote omitted). 
